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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Trial Court Case No.: CV 09-420
WILLIAM P. TEURLINGS,
Appeal Docket No.: 40502-2012
Plaintiff!Appellant,
v.
MALLORY E. LARSON, nka MALLORY
E. MARTINEZ,
Defendant!Respondent.
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On appeal from the District of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for the County of Clearwater

Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge Presiding.
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ARGUMENT

The legal arguments raised in Respondent's Brief were addressed in
Appellant's Opening Brief. This Reply Brief clarifies and rebuts Respondent's
understanding of the facts in the record.

1. There are disputed issues of fact as to whether Ms. Martinez was either
carrying out a direct order at the time of the accident or on a "special
errand."
Respondent's Brief alleges that Ms. Martinez was carrying out a direct order by
her superior at the time of the accident. According to Martinez,
On January 7, 2007, when the accident in this case occurred, Ms.
Martinez was a member of the Idaho National Guard, on duty pursuant
to 32 U.S.C.A. § 502 and complying with a direct order from her
superior officer to transport a fellow guardsman to Boise, Idaho. 1
However, evidence in the record shows that Ms. Martinez was not carrying out
a specific order by her superior officer. Mr. Rice, Ms. Martinez's supervisor, stated by
affidavit as follows:
If an Idaho National Guard soldier, such as Larson [Martinez], is on
active weekend duty and is transporting personnel or materials for or
upon order of her commander(s), she would be provided a government
vehicle, with fuel, food, and lodging. The army pays the guardsmen'S
room and board while at their duty station if they live outside the
commuting distance of 50 miles, but commuting to and from such duty
station is at the sole option, responsibility and expense of said
commuters. 2

I

2

Respondent's Brief, p.lO.
Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, R. pp. 358-59.
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The distance from Lewiston to Boise is over 300 miles. Of course Ms. Martinez was
not "transporting personnel"; rather, she was commuting home after being "released
early."

Mr. Rice further stated,
Although I asked Larson to provide transportation for her passenger,
PV2 Danielle Poe, and they were released from weekend duty station
early on January 7, 2007, it does not alter the fact that commuting to and
from their duty station in Lewiston, was solely at these guardsmen's
option, responsibility, and expense. 3

It is clear from this statement that Ms. Martinez was asked and not ordered to give

a fellow guardsman a ride, and it is clear that the National Guard had no control over
how Ms. Martinez returned home from her training. Neither the National Guard nor
Ms. Martinez's supervisor Mr. Rice imposed obligations regarding route, manner of
travel, or other work-related duties. Martinez was driving her own vehicle on her own
dime.
2. Ms. Martinez was not compensated for travel expenses, nor was she being
paid for her travel home from training.

Respondent's Brief claims that "Ms. Martinez was being paid by the National
Guard when this accident occurred.,,4 This statement is misleading.
Ms. Martinez was not being paid for her travel to Boise. Ms. Martinez was not
"on the clock" at the time of the accident. The record shows that Martinez received no

3
4

Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, R. pp. 358-59.
Respondent's Brief, p.l I.
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compensation for commuting and is paid with a "flat fee" for each weekend of
training, regardless of where she decides to live. s
Q. Kay, now when you're on Guard Duty, are you paid wages

while you're travelling to and from?
A.Um ...
Q. Or are you just paid a flat fee for the weekend or how are you
paid?
A. I'm paid a flat fee for the weekend.
Q. Okay.
A. How it works.
Q. So out of that you have to, your salary and your travel
expenses and all that?
A. Yes. 6

The facts in the record show that Ms. Martinez was not being compensated for
her travel time. Ms. Martinez was not paid by the hour; she was not being reimbursed
in any way for driving home. The National Guard did not pay for her fuel or provide a
vehicle.
In fact, according to her superior officer, had Martinez truly been carrying out
orders to transport a fellow guardsman, Martinez "would be provided a government
vehicle, with fuel, food, and lodging.,,7 According to Martinez's superior officer,
"The army pays the guardsmen's room and board while at their duty station if they
live outside the commuting distance of 50 miles.,,8 According to Martinez's superior
officer, transporting personnel is completely different than commuting to work:

Affidavit of Ned Cannon, Ex.F "Recorded Personal Statement of Mallory Martinez," R. p.253.
Affidavit of Ned Cannon, Ex.F "Recorded Personal Statement of Mallory Martinez," R. p.253.
7 Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, R. pp. 358-59.
8 Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, R. pp. 358-59.
5

6
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"commuting to and from such duty station is at the sole option, responsibility and
expense of said commuters.,,9
In this case, the record is clear that Ms. Martinez was not reimbursed for travel
expenses. Nor was she "being paid by the National Guard when this accident
occurred"-Martinez was paid a stipend completely unconnected to her commute. It
is misleading for Respondent to state that "Ivls.
National Guard when this accident occurred.

~fartinez

was being paid by the

10

3. Ms. Martinez was not a "traveling employee" because Ms. l\lartinez's
employer did not require her to commute to and from Boise.

Respondent argues that because Ms. Martinez lived in Boise and worked in
Lewiston, she is a "travelling employee." Every person who lives in a city different
from where he or she works is not a "traveling employee."
In Idaho, pursuant to the "coming and goingll rule articulated by Idaho courts,
an employee is not acting within the course and scope of his employment while he is
on his way to and from work. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 155 P.3d 695 (2007).
(citing Ridg11Jay v. Combined Ins. Companies of America, 98 Idaho 410,411,565 P.2d
1367,1368 (1977)).
Employers almost always allow their employees to live wherever they choose,
so long as they make it to work on time. Ms. Martinez elected to live in Boise. She
could have chosen to live within minutes of her Lewiston-based employer-or, she

9

10

Supplemental Affidavit of SSG Tony Rice, R. pp. 358-59.
Respondent's Brief, p.ll.
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could have elected to live in Coeur D' Alene, Pocatello, or even San Francisco. The
National Guard did not require Ms. Martinez to travel; Ms. Matinez's living
arrangement required her to travel.
4. Whether the National Guard elected to pay Ms. Martinez's medical bills
should have no bearing on how this Court interprets Idaho law.
Respondent's Brief contends that the National Guard's payment of Martinez's
medical bills should influence this Court's interpretation of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
According to Respondent's Brief, "the medical bills [Ms. Martinez] incurred as a
result of the accident were paid by the Army National Guard. If Ms. Martinez had not
been acting in accordance to duty at the time of the accident, her medical bills would
not have been paid by the National Guard." II
The National Guard's payment of Ms. Martinez's medical bills was dictated by
the National Guard's own internal policies and procedures. Those policies and
procedures were not disclosed to the trial court, nor are those policies and procedures
before the Court. The National Guard's internal policies and procedures should have
no bearing on how this Court interprets the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Whether Ms.
Martinez was "on duty" for purposes of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is matter of
statutory interpretation.
5. Ms. Martinez uniform has no bearing on whether she was "on duty" at the
time of the accident.

Respondent's Brief states,

11

Respondent's Brief, p.ll.
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[A]t the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez and the passenger she was
transporting were in full uniform with their rank and military affiliation
clearly displayed. Ms. Martinez rode in the ambulance with plaintiff and
he would have observed her in her military uniform. 12
Respondent wants this Court to draw the following inference: Ms. Martinez
\vas in full uniform, therefore Ms. Martinez was "on duty."
However, Respondent fails to site any legal authority in support of this
position. Nor would one expect to find legal authority in support of this position-it is
inconceivable that a government employee returning home from work is immune from
liability for any tort simply because she chose to drive home in her uniform.
Presumably, nearly all government employees (and private employees) drive to and
from work in work uniforms.
6. Idaho state courts have jurisdiction to grant Mr. Teurlings the relief he
seeks.

Respondent's Brief states, "The appropriate forum for the resolution of claims
arising under those circumstances is federal court with federal claims. The only claim
plaintiff alleged in his Complaint in this matter was a state law claim for negligence
for which, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904(4), Ms. Martinez cannot be held liable.,,13
This is the first time Ms. Martinez has raised the argument that Mr. Teurlings's
Complaint should be resolved in federal court. Ms. Martinez has not previously argued
that an Idaho state court lacks jurisdiction, neither has she moved for removal of this
case to federal court.

12
13

Respondent's Brief, p. 11.
Respondent's Brief, p.12.
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In order for Ms. Martinez's jurisdiction argument to be persuasive, one would
have to assume precisely what Ms. Martinez asks the Court to conclude-that a
National Guard member returning home from work is on duty. Ms. Martinez was sued
in Idaho state court because the alleged negligent action occurred on an Idaho public
road.
7. Ms. Martinez is not entitled to attorney fees or costs on appeal.

The law is not well settled on what it means to be "on duty" for purposes of
Section 6-904(4). However, it is clear that neither the Idaho Legislature nor the United
States' Congress explicitly provided National Guard members immunity for their
travel or commuting to and from work. It was legal error for the district court to grant
immunity without a law providing for such.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, Mr. Teurlings petitions this Court to reverse the
trial court's entry of summary judgment and the trial court's denial of Teurlings' s
motion for reconsideration and find that Ms. Martinez was not entitled to immunity
while commuting home pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904. In the alternative, Mr.
Teurlings respectfully petitions the Court to find that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether Ms. Martinez was acting within the course and scope of her
employment at the time of the accident.
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DATED this

SMITH & CANNON PLLC

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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